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Abstract
Based on Green and Porter's (GP) noncooperative game theoretic model, oligopsonists
are hypothesized to follow a discontinuous pricing strategy in equilibrium. The model al-
lows for low procurement prices during cooperative phases and high procurement prices
(i.e., aggressive purchasing) during noncooperative phases. In this paper, the GP model is
applied to the U.S. beef-packing industry. Anecdotal evidence of beef-packer margins and
relevant processing costs suggest part of the margin variability could be attributed break-
downs and returns to cooperative phases. To operationalize the GP framework, we apply
Hamilton's Regime-Switching model assuming a ¯rst-order Markov process to test for the
cooperative/competitive behavior of beef packers in three main fed-cattle markets in the
central United States and the whole U.S. market. We ¯nd that the evidence of coopera-
tive/compeitive conduct among the beef packers is present in all the markets examined, but
the conduct varies across markets.
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11 Introduction
The U.S. fed cattle industry has seen shifts of production to larger farms since the 1980s, but
the beef-packing industry has become much more concentrated than cattle feeding (MacDon-
ald and McBride 2009). In the 1990s, beef-packing plants increased in size and decreased
in number. The average number of slaughter per plant increased by 5 times from 32,383 in
1972, to 163,071 heads in 1998 (Ward and Schoeder 2002). The number of slaughter plants
for cattle declined from over 600 in 1980 to about 170 in 1999 (Barkema, Drabenstott and
Novack 2001). As of 1999, the four largest beef packers account for 80% of the national
beef slaughter, as opposed to 36% in 1980 (GIPSA 2002). The Her¯ndahl-Hirschmann In-
dex (HHI) for steer and heifer slaughter increased from 999 in 1985 to 1,982 in 1995, which
was above the threshold level of 1,800, and considered as moderately concentrated (ERS
1998). Pro¯ts in beef packing in the mid-1990s were several times higher than the early
1990s (Ward and Schoeder 1996). Although some argued that higher pro¯ts were a result of
lower processing costs due to economies of scale (Brester and Marsh 2001; MacDonald and
Ollinger 2005), this type of argument does not consider the possibility of lower prices paid
to the cattle feeders due to imperfect competition.
For many years, the increased concentration contributed by the series of mergers and
acquisitions among beef-packing ¯rms in the 1980s and 1990s has raised a major public
policy concern about whether increased concentration has provided beef packers with the
market power to lower the fed-cattle prices. There are a lot of studies in the literature
on the market power in the beef-packing industry. Some studies ¯nd that higher levels of
concentration generally lead to lower prices paid for fed cattle by examining the relationship
between regional fed-cattle prices and beef-packing concentration(e.g., Azzam and Schroeter
1991; Marion and Geithman 1995; Azzam 1997). Some ¯nd monopsony price distortions
in the beef channel by estimating aggregate e®ects from structural changes (e.g., Schroeter
1988; Schroeter and Azzam 1990; Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990). Beef packer conjectures
suggest a distortion of 1% to 3% of fed-cattle prices due to the concentration (Schroeter
1988). Others ¯nd no evidence of market power exercised by the beef packers during the
study years (e.g., Morrison-Paul 2001).
2Most of these studies have used either the structure-conduct-performance paradigm or
the conjectural-variation approach. Although both approaches have proven very informative,
they have been criticized when applied to the beef-packing industry. The estimated relation-
ships re°ected correlations rather than cause and e®ect in the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm. And, despite the fact that regional markets are most relevant in fed-cattle pro-
curement, the conjectural-variation approach did not examine the regional markets (Koontz,
Garcia and Hudson 1993).
There are three studies that have evaluated the beef-packing industry in the context
of regime switching. Koontz, Garcia and Hudson (KGH 1993) used a noncooperative game
model to study meat-packer behavior. They assessed the degree of oligopsony power exercised
by beef packers through examination of daily movements in the regional beef margins and
the evidence of the exercise of market power was indicated during the early-to-mid 1980s
in the markets examined. Koontz and Garcia (KG 1997) later extended the single-market
model in KGH (1993) to multiple markets and found that low prices were paid in all relevant
markets in the cooperative phase, while high prices were paid in the noncooperative phase
in the early-to-mid 1980s. Azzam and Park (1993) adopted Bresnahan's procedure to test
for switching market conduct in the beef slaughter industry. They found the evidence of
market power by identifying the starting and ending points for the two distinct regimes of
competitive and cooperative conduct.
In the present paper, we extend the KGH (1993) model in two important ways. First,
we use data from the 1990s, when concentration levels rose substantially. Indeed, many
past studies have found some degree of monopsony power in beef packing using data from
the 1960s to the 1980s, even though concentration levels, at least on a national scale, were
not viewed as overly problematic. From 1990 to 1999, the four-¯rm concentration rose
another 10% to 80% (Schoeder and Azzam 1999). One purpose of this study is to assess
whether or not advances in concentration have provided for more extensive or di®erent
forms of oligopsony power. Second, instead of using a Bernoulli process to describe the
dynamics of regime switching in KGH (1993) and KG (1997), we employ the algorithm in
Hamilton's (1989) regime-switching model assuming a ¯rst-order Markov process to test for
the cooperative/competitive behavior of beef packers in three major U.S. fed-cattle markets
3and the national market. We use a Markov process because it is suggested by the trigger
strategy from the economic model, and it is computationally feasible for the ¯rst-order
Markov process by using Hamilton's (1989) econometric approach. Given the nature of
fed-cattle purchasing patterns, using weekly data (as opposed to KGH's use of daily data)
may provide a better platform for understanding the potential breakdowns in cooperative
behavior that would constitute switches between regimes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines a model of a
noncooperative repeated pricing game among the beef packers with complete but imper-
fect information. Section 3 discusses the econometric model we use. The margin model
using a Multivariate Markov-Switching framework is explained by some variables that are
regime dependent and the others that are regime independent. The beef packers' coop-
erative/competitive conduct is not directly observable but is subsumed into the margin
model. We use the margin variability due to the switching regimes to test for coopera-
tive/competitive behavior of beef packers. Section 4 provides a description of the data and
the estimation results. Evidence of cooperative/competitive conduct among the beef pack-
ers is present in all the markets examined, but the conduct is di®erent across markets. The
conclusion and the suggestions for future research are in Section 5.
2 Economic Model
The economic model in this paper is very similar to the one from KGH (1993). Based on
Green and Porter's (1984) noncooperative game theoretic model, our economic model is a
noncooperative repeated pricing game among n beef packers with complete but imperfect
information. The assumptions of the model are:
1. The n beef packers buy an undi®erentiated product | fed cattle from the regional
cash market;
2. No exit or entry in the long run is considered in the game;
3. Beef packers understand the market structure well;
4. Beef packers cannot observe the pricing actions by others;
5. Beef packers are risk neutral and only maximize their expected pro¯t.
4Beef packers' pro¯ts each period are determined by price competition for fed cattle and
the pro¯t of the ith beef packer is given by:
¼i(pit;pjt;zt) = (rt ¡ pitk)yit(pit;pjt;Wt;»t) ¡ ci(zt;yit) (1)
where pit is the cattle price paid by the ith packer at time t, pjt is a vector of cattle prices
paid by all other packers, rt is the price of boxed beef, k is the inverse of the proportion of
live animal converted to beef (cutability ratio), Wt is a vector of exogenous variables, yit is
the beef quantity the ith packer produces from fed cattle and other inputs, »t is a random
term, ci is the variable processing cost of the ith beef packer and is a function of zt, a vector
of non-cattle variable input prices, and yit. The set up of the variable processing cost in
equation (1) is fundamentally di®erent from the one in KGH (1993) in which beef packers'
variable processing costs do not depend on the meat quantity or yit. The reason for this
di®erence is that KGH used daily data and in such a short run, all the costs except the costs
of fed cattle were considered as ¯xed and did not vary with the output. While in the current
paper, we are using the weekly data, so the production process is in the longer-run, and
variable costs include both the costs of cattle slaughtered and other non-cattle inputs such
as energy and labor. We assume Leontief beef production because of the limited substitution
between fed cattle and other inputs.
In this repeated game, given the packer's own pricing strategy sit, other packers' strategies
sjt and the discount rate ±, beef packer i is trying to maximize the sum of the current and












i 6= j;i;j = 1;:::;n and 0 < ± < 1
If the prices under one-shot Nash are denoted as p00 and prices under collusion as p0, then
the few beef packers in the market will cooperate as long as:
Vi(p0) > Vi(p00) for all i (3)
5Di®erent from the single-period game where packers can increase the price paid for the
fed cattle without the fear of any punishment, in the repeated game, punishment can be used
to deter the behavior of increasing the fed-cattle price unilaterally by any packer. If some
packer secretly increases the cattle price o®er to p¤ and p¤ > p0, all the packers will o®er the
single-period Nash price p00 and p00 > p0. Therefore, if collusive pricing is beef packers' pricing
strategy in equilibrium, the expected returns from cooperation should be greater than the
expected returns from cheating followed by the Nash behavior:
Vi(p0) > ¼i(p¤) + 1
1+±Vi(p00) for all ¯rms (4)
According to Green and Porter (1984), each ¯rm cannot directly observe other ¯rms'
actions. However, they can observe their own margin level which is the di®erence between
the boxed-beef price and the fed-cattle price. Their pricing strategies each period would
be dependent on their own observed margin in the previous periods. Therefore, when the
beef packers cannot observe each other's pricing behavior, they try to maximize their value





p0 if ¹ < mt¡1
p00 if ¹ ¸ mt¡1 in the last T ¡ 1 period
(5)
where ¹ is the trigger margin level, and mt¡1 is the margin level in the previous period. If
the beef packer's own observed margin in the previous period is greater than the trigger level
¹, this packer o®ers a cooperative price p0. However, if the observed margin in the previous
T-1 periods is less than ¹, this packer o®ers a competitive price p00. In this way, the trigger
strategy allows cooperation among the beef packers on the equilibrium path because any
cheater would be punished by getting low pro¯ts for T-1 periods after it unilaterally raises
the fed-cattle price.
With the trigger strategy, the value function for a packer starting in the cooperative
phase is given by the sum of the current period collusive pro¯t and the discounted expected
6future pro¯ts weighted by the occurrence probability of cooperation and competition:
Vi(p
0) = ¼i(p
0) + Pr(¹ < mt)±Vi(p
0) (6)























(1 + ±)T(¼i(p0) ¡ ¼i(p00))
(1 ¡ ±)T ¡ (1 + ±)T¡1 + ((1 + ±)T¡1 ¡ 1)F
(7)
Beef packers choose the price to maximize the expected returns, so the interior solution
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f = 0 (8)
where f is the density function of F. The actions of beef packers are discontinuous: they
aggressively purchase fed cattle in the competitive state and o®er a lower price for fed cattle
in the cooperative state.
Suppose the detection of cheating behavior and the subsequent punishment can take
place in a timely manner. For a collusive equilibrium to exist in the multiple-period game,

















Equation (9) means that the expected returns from tacit collusion are greater than the pro¯ts
from cheating for one period followed by T-1 periods of punishment pro¯ts. If we can ¯nd
T;¹;p0; and p00 to satisfy both equations (8) and (9), a collusive equilibrium will exist.
In our game, price wars are part of the equilibrium behavior because the fed-cattle supply
is subject to random unobservable shocks and the packers' price o®ers are not observed
by their competitors. When a low margin is observed, packers could not tell if it is a
7consequence of a deviation from the collusive pricing by one of their rivals or if it is due
to a low realization of the fed-cattle supply shock. Following Green and Porter (1984),
some degree of collusion can be sustained in our game by trigger strategies that involve
aggressive fed-cattle procurement whenever the margin level drops below some endogenously
determined threshold value.
3 Econometric Model
As we discussed in the previous section, we expect to see a discontinuous pattern in beef
packers' margins when a trigger strategy is the equilibrium strategy. We will look for the col-
lusive conduct by calculating the length of the cooperative regime. Beef packers' oligopsony
power exists if we can ¯nd the duration of cooperation su±ciently long.
The beef packers maximize their pro¯ts in equation (1) through price choice. The ¯rst
order condition is given by:
@¼i
@pi























] = 0 (10)
Assume that the e®ect of the jth ¯rm's price on the ith ¯rm's fed-cattle purchase is
smaller than the e®ect of its own price, and ¯rms are symmetric. Let
@yi




q, where q > 1 is a constant, then equation (10) then becomes:






]° = kyi (11)





q = ¯ and ¯ be the sum of packers'
conjectures about each other's price o®er for fed cattle, then ¯ = 0, when ¯rms are in the
competitive regime because the packers only o®er the one-shot Nash price and ¯ > 0, if
they are in the cooperative regime because the packers all o®er lower prices. Because only
aggregate regional data is available, we sum up equation (11) over n ¯rms and obtain:
(rt ¡ ptk ¡ mct)(1 ¡ ¯)° = kyt (12)
8Rewriting it, we have the regional margin equation:




For econometric estimation, we assume a generalized Leontief cost function for the beef-
processing industry:




t(±1w1t + ±2w2t) (14)
where w1 is the labor price and w2 is the energy price. Then the marginal processing cost
of the beef packers is given by:
mct = ±11w1t + ±22w2t + 2±12
p
w1tw2t + 2yt(±1w1t + ±2w2t) (15)
The regional margin in equation (13) can now be written as:
mt = rt ¡ ptk = ±11w1t + ±22w2t + 2±12
p




In equation (16), yt is the weekly regional cattle supply. However, weekly regional cattle
supply data is not available, so we need to estimate the supply. In the regional fed-cattle
cash market, market-ready inventories are the available supply over which beef packers and
cattle feeders negotiate. Although they are not measured in any government report, they are
discussed and measured informally by the industry participants. Because the market-ready
inventory data is also not available, we use the following weekly marketing model to estimate
the weekly market-ready inventories:
rwt = ® + ®1rwt¡1 + ®2D2 + ®3D3 + ®4D4 + ®5D5 + ®6D6 + ®7D7 + ®8D8
+ ®9D9 + ®10D10 + ®11D11 + ®12D12 + ®13plclag4m + ®14plclag5m
+ ®15plclag6m + ®16coflag1m + ®17corn + et (17)
where rwt is the weekly slaughter value, rwt¡1 is the slaughter number in the previ-
9ous week, D2;D3;D4;D5;D6;D7;D8;D9;D10;D11;D12 are the monthly dummy variables,
plclag4m, plclag5m, and plclag6m are the regional cattle placements 4, 5 and 6 months prior
respectively, coflag1m is the last month's regional cattle on feed, and corn is the price of corn.
According to KGH (1993), weekly marketing is not a®ected by the fed-cattle price, rather
it is a®ected by cattle feeders' marginal decision of either sending the cattle to slaughter or
keeping the cattle on feed. So their marginal decision is dependent on the seasonal availabil-
ity of feeder cattle, cattle inventory and the feeding cost. The marketing model is estimated
using GLS. The residual from this model shows the variation of market-ready inventories.
For example, the market-ready inventories expand this week if the estimated marketings ex-
ceed the actual slaughter value and market-ready inventories decrease if the actual slaughter
is more than the estimated number.
From the fact that a periodic shift from a margin increase to a margin drop is a recurrent
feature of the cattle markets, our empirical model will relate the margin between boxed-
beef and fed-cattle prices with the factors such as processing costs, market-ready inventory
variation and the unobserved state of cooperation among beef packers. The unobserved
state of cooperation among beef packers is included in the last term of equation (16) because
the parameter varies in di®erent regimes, i.e., ¯rms are in the competitive regime if ¯ = 0
and they are in the cooperative regime if ¯ > 0. Instead of using the estimated market-
ready inventories as yt in the regional margin equation (16), we use the residuals from the
weekly marketing model because the inclusion of the estimated market ready inventories
can be interpreted as market power by the switching model, but they are really supply
and demand dynamics. The ¯nal margin estimation model follows a Multivariate Markov-
Switching framework:
mt = ºst + ¯
s^ yt + °1w1t + °2w2t + °3(2
p















where ^ yt is the market-ready inventory variation obtained from equation (17).
Let St = f1;2g denote the 2-state unobserved regime with St = 1, representing the
10competitive regime and St = 2, representing the cooperative regime. The transition between
these two states is governed by a ¯rst-order Markov process:
Prob[St = 1jSt¡1 = 1] = p Prob[St = 2jSt¡1 = 1] = 1 ¡ p
Prob[St = 2jSt¡1 = 2] = q Prob[St = 1jSt¡1 = 2] = 1 ¡ q (19)
»1
t and »2
t in equation (17) are the \shadow random variables" and they are given by
»1
t = ISt=1 and »2
t = ISt=2, where It is the information set available at t (Bellone 2005).
Therefore, the conditional probabilities related to the two states are:
P(St = 1jIt) = E(»
1
tjIt)
P(St = 2jIt) = E(»
2
tjIt)
In the Markov-Switching model in equation (17), ^ yt is the only exogenous variable that
is subject to switching regimes and (w1t;w2t;2
p
w1tw2t;2^ ytw1t;2^ ytw2t) are the exogenous
variables that are not subject to the switching regimes. Therefore (¯s;·1;·2;½1;½2) is the
vector of regression coe±cients which are regime-dependent and ° = (°1;°2;°3;°4;°5) is the
vector of regression coe±cients which are regime-independent.
Following the estimation of Multivariate Markov-Switching models developed by Bel-
lone (2004, 2005), with the normality assumption of "t, the conditional probability density
function of mt is given by:











where £ = (p;q;¯s;°;·;½) and §j = ½1»1
t + ½2»2
t. Then the unconditional density of mt is
calculated by summing conditional densities over the two values of St:
f(mtjIt¡1;£) = §
2
j=1P(St = jjIt¡1;£)f(mtjSt = j;It¡1;£) (21)





4 Data and Estimation Results
The data set used in this paper is from Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC),
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and the Department of Labor. There are
three fed-cattle markets | Kansas, Colorado and Texas, and one national market in the
study. These three states are chosen because they are the most important markets in the
U.S. fed-cattle producing regions. The beef prices are the weekly boxed-beef cutout values.
These price series are then converted to regional margins by subtracting the reginal fed-cattle
price converted to a carcass equivalent (price/0.615) from the boxed-beef cutout values. To
remove the impact of in°ation, the margin values are de°ated and the the base year is 1995.
The energy price index is from the producer price index for the meat-packing industry and the
labor price is the average hourly production worker earnings for the meat-packing industry.
The weekly slaughter, cattle placement and cattle on feed numbers used for Kansas, Texas
and Colorado are from region 7, 6 and 8 respectively. And those for the national market are
the sum of the corresponding values in regions 5, 6, 7 and 8. The corn price for Kansas is
the Nebraska corn price, and the corn price for Texas and Colorado is the Texas corn price.
Because our economic model requires a relatively stable market structure, our study period
is from January, 1993 to January, 2001, when concentration level was high and meanwhile
the four-¯rm concentration ratio in terms of steer and heifer slaughter was relatively stable.
Before 1993, and since 2001, a lot of mergers and acquisitions occurred in the beef-packing
industry, which violated the assumption of stable market structure in the economic model.
We estimate the weekly marketing model in equation (18) using GLS and the results are
reported in Table I. The amount of slaughter in the week before has a signi¯cantly positive
e®ect on this week's slaughter in all four markets. The cattle on feed last month in the
corresponding region has a signi¯cantly positive e®ect on the slaughter amount each week
in Texas, Colorado and the national markets. Cattle placements and corn price have no
impact on the weekly numbers of slaughtering. We then estimate the Markov-Switching
12model of equation (17) using MSVARlib developed by Bellone (2005). We let state 1 be
the competitive state and state 2 be the cooperative state. A possible outcome that might
have been expected as a prior would associate the states st = 1 and 2 with margin drop
and margin growth due to the unknown factors in the regional fed-cattle markets. Applying
Hamilton's (1989) algorithms of ¯ltering and smoothing to margin changes in three regional
fed cattle markets and the national market, numerical maximization of the conditional log
likelihood function led to the maximum likelihood estimates reported in Tables II and III.
Speci¯cally, the MLE of the regime-independent parameters are shown in Table II and the
MLE of the regime-dependent parameters are shown in Table III. Using the Jarque and
Bera test, the normality hypothesis of the residuals cannot be rejected for all three regional
models and the national model.
In Kansas, prob(St=1jSt¡1=1) = 0.958 and prob(St=2jSt¡1=2) = 0.944. This shows
that the beef packers will cooperate in the current period with a possibility of 94.4%, if they
cooperate in the previous period and with a 95.8% chance they will not cooperate now if
they compete in the previous period.
In Texas, the beef packers will cooperate in the current period with a possibility of 96.6%,
if they cooperate in the previous period and with a 92.6% chance they will not cooperate in
the current period if they compete in the previous period.
In Colorado,the beef packers will cooperate in the current period with a possibility of
93.3%, if they cooperate in the previous period and with a 97.5% chance they do not coop-
erate now if they compete in the previous period.
In the national market, the beef packers will cooperate in the current period with a
probability of 94.1%, if they cooperate in the previous period and with a 96.3% chance they
will not cooperate now if they compete in the previous period.
The estimation results show that the beef packers in these four markets are consistent in
their cooperative/competitive behavior. In Kansas, Colorado and the national market, with
a probability of 96 - 97%, beef packers will compete based on the fact that they compete one
period before, and with a probability of 93-94%, beef packers will cooperate conditional on
their cooperation in the previous period. Texas is a little di®erent, the conditional probability
of competition is lower, while the conditional probability of cooperation is higher comparing
13with the other regions.
From the MLE results in Table III, we ¯nd that ¯s parameters in all markets are positive
in both competitive and cooperative regimes. In addition, ¯s in the cooperate regime is larger
than that in the competitive regime. This infers that the average conjecture across the ¯rms
indicated by parameter ¯ in equation (16) is between 0 and 1. These empirical results
are consistent with the theoretical expectations. The expansion of market-ready inventories
results in the increase of the beef packers' margin, and vice versa. In the cooperative regime,
because of the conjectures by the packers, i.e., 0 < ¯ < 1, the impact of market-ready
inventory variation on the packers' margin is even bigger in size.
From the maximum likelihood parameters, we also calculate the expected durations of
cooperation and competition. Conditional on being either in cooperative state or competitive









¸¡1(1 ¡ q) = (1 ¡ q)
¡1 (24)
The results are shown in Table IV. The expected durations of cooperation are 17.86 weeks,
29.41 weeks, 14.93 weeks and 16.95 weeks for Kansas, Texas, Colorado and the national
market respectively. The expected durations of competition are 23.81 weeks, 13.51 weeks,
40 weeks and 27.03 weeks for Kansas, Texas, Colorado and the national market respectively.
In Kansas and the national market, the expected duration of cooperation is approximately
2/3 of the expected duration of competition. In Colorado, the cooperation time is about 1/3
of the competition time. While in Texas, the cooperation duration is about one-half more
than the competition time.
Using Hamilton's (1989) ¯lter techniques, the inferred probabilities that the beef packers
in the three regional markets and the national market are in the competitive state (St =
1) and the cooperative state (St = 2) at time t based on the available information at that
1Detailed calculation is in Hamilton's 1989 paper.
14time P[St=1j"t, "t¡1,...] are calculated. The results are reported in Figures 1 to 4. Following
Hamilton, our decision rule is that beef packers are in the cooperative regime when P[St = 2]
> 0.5, and they are in the competitive regime when P[St = 1] > 0.5, because the algorithm
we use can reach a fairly strong conclusion about which regime beef packers are in.
The beginning and ending time of the inferred cooperative regime in the four markets
are identi¯ed in Table V. In Kansas, beef packers tacitly cooperate for 7 months in 1993, 4
months in 1994, 5 months in 1995, 2 months in 1996, 9 months in 1997, 6 months in 1999
and 7 months in 2000. The total time of cooperation accounts for 42.9% of the 8 years. In
Texas, beef packers tacitly cooperate approximately 68.5% of the 8 years in study. They
cooperate for the whole year of 1993, 9 months in 1994, 7 months in 1995, 3 months in 1996,
1 month in 1997, 4 months in 1998, 11 months in 1999, and 10 months in 2000. In Colorado,
beef packers tacitly cooperate 27.2% of the 8 years examined. They cooperate for 4 months
in 1994, 7 months in 1996, 11 months in 1998, and 1 month in 1999. In the national market,
beef packers tacitly cooperate about 38.5% of the 8 years and compete in the rest of the
time. They cooperate for 6 months in 1993, 3 months in 1994, 3 months in 1995, 3 months
in 1996, 11 months in 1997, 6 months in 1999 and 6 months in 2000.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we apply the GP model using Hamilton's Markov-Regime-Switching technique
to the U.S. beef-packing industry. The weekly margin between boxed-beef and fed-cattle
prices is modeled and the unobserved cooperative/competitive conduct among beef packers
in the four fed-cattle markets is analyzed. The results at the regional markets suggest
varied levels of cooperative and competitive regimes exist in the years examined. Based on
the regime type in the previous period, in Texas, beef packers have a higher conditional
probability of cooperation than competition. While in Kansas, Colorado and the national
market, the conditional probability of cooperation is lower than that of competition. The
inference of probability of beef packers being in the two regimes is calculated. We ¯nd
that the fed-cattle market in Texas is in cooperation for more than one-half of the time
during the eight years in study, while the fed cattle markets in Kansas, Colorado and the
15national market are in a competitive state for about one-third of the study years and in a
noncooperative state for the remainder. Market power appears to have been exercised in
the fed-cattle procurement from the early 1990s to the early 2000s, but the conduct varies
across regions. Future research will focus on modifying the main factors that explain the
margin variability of beef packers, and on including higher-order Markov processes in the
multivariate regime switching.
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19Table I: GLS Estimates of Weekly Marketing Model 
 
  Kansas  Texas  Colorado  U.S. 
















































































































































Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
20Table II: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Regime Independent Parameters 
 
  Kansas  Texas  Colorado  U.S. 

























































Likelihood  -575.84  -571.21  -574.81  -582.57 
Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table III: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Regime Dependent Parameters  
 
 
Competitive Regime  
(St = 1) 
Cooperative Regime  
(St = 2) 
β
s  κ1  ρ1  β



































0.033   
(0.897) 
















Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
  21Table IV:  Expected Duration of Cooperation and Non-Cooperation in 
weeks 
 
Region  Expected duration of 
cooperation 
Expected duration of 
 non-cooperation 
Kansas  17.86  23.81 
Texas  29.41  13.51 
Colorado  14.93  40.00 





Table V: Inferred Cooperative Regime 
Kansas  Texas  Colorado  U.S. 
Begin  End  Begin  End  Begin  End  Begin  End 
1993: Jan.  1993: Apr.  1993: Jan.  1994:Apr.  1994: May  1994: Aug.  1993: Jan.  1993: Mar. 
1993: Oct.  1994: Mar.  1994: Aug.  1995: Jan.  1996: Mar.  1996: June  1993: Oct.  1994: Feb. 
1994: Dec.  1995: Feb.  1995: July  1996: Mar.  1996: Oct.  1996: Dec.  1994: Dec.  1995: Jan. 
1995: Oct.  1996: Feb.  1997: Jan.  1998: Jan.  1998: Feb.  1999: Jan.  1995: Nov.  1996: Mar. 
1997: Mar.  1997: Nov.  1998: Apr.  1998: June  1997: Feb.  1997: Dec. 
1999: Mar.  1999: Aug.  1999: Feb.  2000: Oct.  1999: Mar.  1999: Aug. 



















Figure 2: Texas: Inferred probability that beef packers are in competitive and cooperative
regimes
23 
Figure 3: Colorado: Inferred probability that beef packers are in competitive and cooperative
regimes
 
Figure 4: National Market: Inferred probability that beef packers are in competitive and
cooperative regimes
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